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Polymorphism in rapidly-changing cyclic environment ∗
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Selection in a time-periodic environment is modeled via the continuous-time two-player replicator
dynamics, which for symmetric pay-offs reduces to the Fisher equation of mathematical genet-
ics. For a sufficiently rapid and cyclic [fine-grained] environment, the time-averaged population
frequencies are shown to obey a replicator dynamics with a non-linear fitness that is induced by
environmental changes. The non-linear terms in the fitness emerge due to populations tracking their
time-dependent environment. These terms can induce a stable polymorphism, though they do not
spoil the polymorphism that exists already without them. In this sense polymorphic populations
are more robust with respect to their time-dependent environments. The overall fitness of the prob-
lem is still given by its time-averaged value, but the emergence of polymorphism during genetic
selection can be accompanied by decreasing mean fitness of the population. The impact of the un-
covered polymorphism scenario on the models of diversity is examplified via the rock-paper-scissors
dynamics, and also via the prisoner’s dilemma in a time-periodic environment.
PACS numbers: 87.23.-n, 87.23.Cc, 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
Organisms live in a changing world and experience
variations of biotic and abiotic environmental factors.
Hence environmental impact on selection and evolution
is an important research subject [1–20] Populations re-
spond to an inhomogeneous environment by developing
polymorphism, where two or more different morphs exist
in one interbreeding population [1–5].
Here are two known examples of polymorphism re-
lated to a time-periodic environment [4, 20]. Popula-
tions of the land snail (Cepaea Nemoralis) consist of
three morphs having respectively brown, pink and yellow
coloured shells. The shell colour is regulated by multi-
ple alleles of one gene; the brown (yellow) allele is the
most dominant (recessive) one. For a population living
in a forrest, the brown and pink morphs have a selec-
tive advantage at the spring time, since they correlate
with the colour of the ground laying making the snail
less visible for predators [4, 20]. The yellow morph has
an advantage at summer and autumn on the yellow-green
laying. In addition, the yellow morph is more resistant
to high and low temperatures [4, 20]. Another example
of polymorphism is the two basic morphs of the spotted
lady beetle (Adalia bipunctata), which carry black (with
red spots) and red (with black spots) colour, respectively
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[21, 22]. This polymorphism relates to the fact that the
black morph is more resistant to extreme conditions (at
winter and summer, or to industrial stresses), while the
red morph does better under normal conditions [21, 22].
In a slow (coarse-grained) environment each individ-
ual sees mainly one fixed environment, which can change
from one generation to another [1]. A rapidly-changing
(i.e fine grained) environment changes many times dur-
ing the life-time of each individual; see the above ex-
ample of Cepaea and note that this snail lives seven to
eight years [4, 20]. A population moving via spatially-
inhomogeneous environment faces the same problems as
a static population in a time-dependent environment.
Much attention was devoted to modeling polymor-
phism in slow environments [1–3, 5, 7–9, 11, 14, 15]. The
main outcome is that morphs in a slow environment are
governed by the geometric mean of their fitness 1 [23].
Rapidly-changing (i.e. fine-grained) environments got
less attention so far. Here the effective fitness is pos-
tulated to be given by arithmetic time-averages of se-
lection coefficients [1, 2, 5, 6, 16]. This is incomplete,
because correlations between the fitness and the state
1 The difference between the geometric and arithmetic average
can be illustrated as follows. The discrete-time logistic growth
Nk+1 = φkNk leads to Nk = e
∑
K
l=1
lnφlN0; thus φk contributes
into the long-time fitness multiplicatively. Hence for K ≫ 1 we
get: 1
K
ln[Nk/N0] = 〈lnφ〉, i.e. the geometric fitness average.
In contrast, the continuous-time logistic growth N˙ = f(t)N in-
tegrates as N(t) = e
∫
t
0
dsf(s)N(0), and f(s) contributes to the
long-time fitness additively. Hence we get the arithmetic average
for T ≫ 1: 1
T
ln[N(T )/N(0)] = 〈f〉.
2of population are not accounted for. Experiments on
the evolution in a rapidly-changing environment show
that evolving populations can respond to time-varying
aspects of their environment [17–19]. The total fitness
during such processes need not increase [19]. It is also
known that individual organisms can develop different
phenotypes in response to different environmental con-
ditions [24]. In particular, the phenotypic difference can
be reversible within a single individual, and can have a
well-defined seasonal periodicity [25]. Thus a theoretical
model is needed to explain how rapidly-changing envi-
ronment leads to polymorphism, and how it relates to
the total fitness of the population [26].
Here we present a theory for polymorphism in
rapidly-changing, time-periodic environment based on
(continuous-time) Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT)
that describes competition of several morphs [27, 28].
This approach unites genetic and phenotypic selection
models into a single and flexible formalism. In a par-
ticular case, EGT leads to continuous-time equations of
classical mathematical genetics [27]. We show that in
addition to the contribution given by time-averaged se-
lection coefficients, there are also non-linear (and non-
perturbative) terms in the effective fitness that emerge
due to tracking by competing morphs of their time-
dependent environment. These non-linear terms predict
new regimes of polymorphism. A polymorpshim that al-
ready exists on the level of the time-averaged selection co-
effients is not eliminated. For genetic selection the overall
fitness—which is shown to be equal to the time-averaged
fitness—does not need to increase in time during the es-
tablishment of the polymorphism. Our results agree with
necessary conditions for new regimes in environmentally
driven population dynamic equations [29, 31].
This paper is organized as follows. Section II recalls
the replicator dynamics. Section III deduces our main
result: a rapidly-changing environment brings in non-
linear (multi-party) fitness. These non-linear terms can
be larger than those given by the average linear fitness.
Section IV discusses the time-averaged and effective fit-
ness. In sections V and VII we present our results on the
polymorphism for the two- and three-morph situation,
respectively. Section V also connects with genetic selec-
tion models in a rapidly-changing (fine-grained) environ-
ment. Section VI studies the famous prisoner’s game in a
time-periodic environment and shows in which concrete
sense such an environment leads to resolving the pris-
oner’s dilemma. Section VII discusses the environment-
induced polymorphism in the rock-paper-scissors dynam-
ics, which is one of the main models for studying biodi-
versity in interacting populations. Section VIII outlines
general aspects of the polymorphism emergence using the
notion of Poincare´ indices. Section IX summarizes our
results and outlines open problems.
II. REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) describes inter-
acting agents separated into several groups (morphs)
[9, 27, 28, 30]. The reproduction of each group is gov-
erned by its fitness, which depends on interactions be-
tween the morphs. The replicator dynamics approach
to EGT describes the time-dependent frequency pk(t) of
the group k, which is the number of agents Nk in the
group k, over the total number of agents in all n groups:
pk = Nk/
∑n
k=1Nk. The (Malthusian) fitness fk of the
group k is a linear function of the frequencies [9, 27, 28]:
fk(a, p) =
∑n
l=1
aklpl, k = 1, . . . , n, (1)
where the payoffs akl (selection coefficients) account for
the interaction between (the agents from) groups k and l.
The replicator dynamics [27, 28] facilitates the (relative)
growth of groups with fitness larger than the mean fitness∑n
l=1plfl:
p˙k = pk[ fk(a, p)−
∑n
l=1
plfl ] ≡ Gk[a, p]. (2)
Note that the same fitness fk(a, p) can be introduced
for the number of agents in each group: N˙k = Nkfk(p).
This is the equation for the logistic growth, but with
frequency-dependent growth rates. We revert to (2) after
substituting pk = Nk/(
∑n
l=1Nl). Now polymorphism
means a stable state, where two or more pk are non-zero.
There are several applications of replicator dynamics:
– Animal (agent contest), where the groups correspond
to the strategies of agent’s behavior, while pk is the prob-
ability by which an agent applies the strategy k [27, 28].
Alternatively, there are different agents each one apply-
ing one fixed strategy. Agents applying similar strategies
can be joined into groups, and then (2) describes the evo-
lution of the relative size of those groups 2. The actual
mechanism by which pk changes depends on the concrete
implementation of the model (inheritance, learning, imi-
tation, infection, etc).
– Selection of genes, where pk is the frequency of one-
locus allele k in panmictic, asexual, diploid population,
and where akl = alk refers to the selective value of the
phenotype driven by the zygote (kl) [9]. Then (1, 2) are
the Fisher equations for the selection with overlapping
generations [9, 27]. Eq. (2) applies to lower-level organ-
isms (such as bacteria), which reproduce almost continu-
ously with each generation bringing a small contribution
to the overall population. The situation with (for in-
stance) a human population, where there are no breeding
seasons (reproduction is continuous) and there are strong
overlaps between generations also roughly corresponds
2 These two situations—different groups of agents, each agent ap-
plying a fixed strategy, or a single agent applying various strate-
gies—are not always equivalent [33].
3to (2). For a more precise description of this situation
one should employ generalizations of (2), which explic-
itly account for the age of each generation; see [9, 10] for
details. Whenever generations overlap, but there is a def-
inite breeding season, one still expects the applicability
of (2) [10].
– Within a two-party game theory between players I
and II, strategies refers to k = 1, . . . , n, in (1). The pay-
off akl is what I gets, if I and II act k and l, respectively.
The replicator approach (1) applies to symmetric games
[27, 28], where akl is also what II gets, if I and II act k
and l, respectively. In such symmetric games, both I and
II apply strategy k with the same probability pk [27, 28].
III. EFFECTIVE EQUATIONS FOR
RAPIDLY-CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
A. Derivation
We consider a varying, but predictable environment,
which acts on the phenotypes making akl periodic func-
tions of time with a single period 2π/ω [9]:
akl(τ) = akl(τ + 2π), τ ≡ ωt. (3)
There are well-defined methods to decide to which extent
a varying environment is predictable for a given organ-
ism [15]. The oscillating payoffs can reflect the fact that
different morphs (alleles, strategies) are dominating at
different times.
We assume that the environment is fast [fine-grained]:
the time-averaged (systematic) change of the population
structure over the environment period 2π/ω is small. We
separate the time-dependent payoffs akl(τ) into the con-
stant part a¯kl and the oscillating part a˜kl(τ):
akl(τ) = a¯kl + a˜kl(τ). (4)
The time-average of the oscillating part is zero:
a˜kl ≡
∫ 2pi
0
dτ
2π
a˜kl(τ) = 0. (5)
Formulas similar to (5) will define below the time-
averages of other periodic functions of τ .
For future purposes let also aˆkl be the primitive of a˜kl
with its time-average equal to zero:
∂τ aˆkl(τ) = a˜kl(τ), aˆkl = 0. (6)
Now aˆkl = 0 makes aˆkl(τ) periodic with the same period
2π; cf. (3). Below we shall frequently use:
a˜kl aˆkl = 0. (7)
Following the Kapitza method [34, 35], we represent
pk as a slowly varying part p¯k plus ǫk[p¯(t), τ ]. The latter
is smaller than p¯k, oscillates fastly on the environment
time τ , and averages to zero:
pk(t) = p¯k(t) + ǫk[p¯(t), τ ], (8)
ǫ¯k[p¯(t)] =
∫ 2pi
0
dτ
2π
ǫk[p¯(t), τ ] = 0, (9)
where the time-average is taken over the fast time τ for
a fixed slow time t. Note that the fast ǫk depends on the
slow p¯.
Now put (8) into (2) and expand the right-hand-side
of (2) over {ǫk}:
˙¯pk + ˙¯pα∂αǫk + ω∂τ ǫk = [1 + ǫα∂α +O(ǫ
2)]Gk[a(τ), p¯],
(10)
where the summation over the repeated Greek indices is
assumed,
AαBα ≡
∑n
α=1
AαBα, (11)
and where
∂αX ≡
∂
∂p¯α
X. (12)
The fast factor ǫi is searched for via expanding over
1
ω :
ǫk =
1
ω
ǫk,1 +
1
ω2
ǫk,2 + . . . . (13)
Substitute this into (10) and recall that Gk is linear over
{akl}:
˙¯pk +
1
ω
˙¯pα∂αǫk,1 + ∂τ ǫk,1 +
1
ω
∂τ ǫk,2 = Gk[a¯(τ), p¯]
+ Gk[a˜(τ), p¯] +
1
ω
ǫα,1 ∂αGk[a(τ), p¯] +O
(
1
ω2
)
.(14)
Eq. (14) contains terms with different time-scales and
of different orders of magnitude. First we select terms
which are of order O(1) and vary on the fast time-scale:
∂τ ǫk,1 = Gk[a˜(τ), p¯(t)] +O(
1
ω
). (15)
This equation can be integrated straightforwardly, be-
cause the characteristic time τ and the slowly-changing
variable p¯(t) are separated from each other [see (8)]:
ǫk[p¯(t), τ ] =
1
ω
ǫk,1 +O(
1
ω2
)
=
1
ω
Gk[aˆ(τ), p¯(t)] +O(
1
ω2
), (16)
where {aˆkl(τ)} is defined in (6). Note from (16) that the
normalization
∑
k ǫk,1 = 0 demanded by (8) does hold.
Once (16) is separated out, we average the remainder
in (10) over the fast time τ and obtain the evolution of
slow terms
˙¯pk = Gk[a¯, p¯] + ǫα[p¯, τ ] ∂αGk[a˜(τ), p¯] +O(
1
ω2
) (17)
= Gk[a¯, p¯] +
1
ω
Gα[aˆ(τ), p¯(t)] ∂αGk[a˜(τ), p¯] +O(
1
ω2
),
(18)
4where the time-average is defined as in (9).
Eq. (18) is a closed equation for the averaged
(slowly-changing) quantities p¯k. When working out
ǫα[p¯, τ ] ∂αGk[a˜(τ), p¯] in (17) we employ aˆb˜ = −a˜bˆ, note
the following simplifying points:∑
nl
aˆkna˜kl p¯np¯l =
∑
klmn
aˆkla˜mn p¯kp¯lp¯mp¯n = 0, (19)
and get again a replicator equation
˙¯pk = p¯k [Fk(p¯)− p¯αFα(p¯)] , k = 1, ..., n, (20)
Fk(p¯) = a¯kαp¯α + bkαβ p¯αp¯β + ckαβγ p¯αp¯β p¯γ , (21)
where Fk is the effective (already non-linear) fitness, and
bklm ≡
1
ω
a˜kl aˆlm, cklmn ≡
1
2ω
aˆkl [a˜mn + a˜nm] , (22)
account for (new) non-linear terms in Fk. Eqs. (20, 21)
is our central result.
Expectedly, the fast environment contributes the time-
averaged payoffs a¯kl into Fk [1]. In addition, each group k
gets engaged into three- and four-party interactions with
payoffs bklm and cklmn, respectively. Recalling our dis-
cussion after (2), we can interpret
∑
lm bklmp¯lp¯m in (21)
as the average pay-off received by one of three players
upon applying strategy k.
The terms with bklm and cklmn in (21) exist due to
tracking of the environment by the morphs; see (8, 18).
These terms need not be small as compared to a¯kl-terms,
since the derivation of (20–22) applies for p¯k ≫ ǫk, which
can hold even for a¯kl → 0. The next-order (omitted)
terms in (21) are already perturbative, i.e. they have to
be smaller than the terms that were kept in (21).
We get bklm = cklmn = 0 [due to (7)], if only one akl
varies in time, or if all a˜kl oscillate at one phase:
a˜kl = a(ωt)ξkl, (23)
where ξkl are constant amplitudes. I.e. the non-linear
terms [with ∝ bklm and ∝ cklmn] are non-zero due to
interference between the environmental oscillations of a˜kl
and those of ǫk, which are delayed over the environmental
oscillations by phase π/2; see (16).
For the existence of non-linear terms we also need the
frequency-dependent selection; e.g. no non-linear terms
similar to (22) will be present for non-interacting repli-
cators
p˙k = pk[ak(t)− aα(t)pα], (24)
because the fitness pkak(t) is a linear function of pk. For
this example p¯k are determined only by the averages a¯k.
Both the emergence of the non-linear terms and their
absence for (24) agree with general necessary conditions
found in [29] for potentially new regimes in environmen-
tally driven population dynamic equations; see [31] for a
recent review.
Now bklm and cklmn that can potentially lead to new
mechanisms of polymorphism, disappear for a very fast
environment ω →∞; see (22). This roughly agrees with
the Intermediate Disturbance Hypothesis, which is well-
known in ecology and population dynamics and which
states that the diversity in coexisting populations is fa-
cilitated by intermediate (for our situation not very fast)
enviromental changes [31] 3.
Finally, we note that whenever the non-linear fitness
terms disappear, e.g. due to (23), one can try to go to the
order of O( 1ω2 ) terms. Appendix A shows that this way
does not lead to a theory that is useful for polymrorphism
scenarios. One reason for this is that—in contrast to non-
linear terms bklm and cklmn in (20–22)—the O(
1
ω2 )-terms
have to be smaller than the average fitness terms a¯kαp¯α.
B. Initial conditions
Looking at (8, 16) one notes that
pk(0) = p¯k(0) +
1
ω
Gk[aˆ(0), p¯(0)] +O(
1
ω2
), (25)
which expresses pk(0) in terms of p¯k(0). The meaning of
(25) is as follows.
When the dynamics is switched on at the initial time
t = 0, pk(t) converges within few oscillation periods from
pk(0) to a function with average p¯k(0). Once this con-
verges is over, p¯k(t) changes slowly. The difference be-
tween pk(0) and p¯k(0) is seen from (25) to depend on the
initial phases of the oscillating functions aln(t), contrary
to an intuitive expectation that these phases will com-
pletely irrelevant for the long-time dynamics. They will
be indeed irrelevant provided that the system posses only
one (stable) rest point. Otherwise, if there are several
attraction basins, the difference between pk(0) and p¯k(0)
will matter at least for those initial conditions which are
close to the boundary between two basins; see below for
more illustrations. This difference is known as the “ini-
tial slip”. It was studied for several classes of dynamical
systems possesing time-scale separation; see [36, 37].
C. Local stability of vertices
The vertex points, where all p¯k’s besides one equal
zero, are rest points of the effective replicator equation
3 Ref. [31] by Fox critically discusses the empiric support of the
intermediate disturbance hypothesis, and opines that such a sup-
port is mostly lacking. In response, Sheil and Burslem [32] ar-
gued that the empirical support is there, but the hypothesis has
to be formulated correctly. We note that [31] contains a lucid
discussion on various theoretical mechanisms by which inhomo-
geneous environment can lead to diversity. But the theoretical
review in Ref. [31] does not focus on environmental time-scales.
Our results broadly agrees with restrictions reviewed in Ref. [31].
5(20–21). Moreover, the non-linear terms bklm and cklmn
do not have influence on the local stability of a vertex,
in the sense that they do not alter the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian at a vertex. To see this, assume that the vertex
is given by p¯1 = 1, and also assume that the indepen-
dent variables over which the Jacobian is to be taken are
p¯1, . . . , p¯n−1. When the Jacobian matrix
{Jkl}
n−1
k,l=1 , Jkl =
∂
∂p¯l
(p¯k [Fk(p¯)− p¯αFα(p¯)]) , (26)
is taken at the vertex, we get
Jkl|p¯1=1 =δkl [Fk(p¯)−F1(p¯) ]|p¯1=1
+δk1 [Fn(p¯)−Fl(p¯) ]|p¯1=1 . (27)
Now note from (22):
Fl|p¯1=1 = a¯l1 + bl11 + cl111 = a¯l1, l = 1, . . . , n. (28)
Eqs. (26–28) show that the Jacobian matrix (and hence
its eigenvalues) at the vertex do not depend on the non-
linear terms bklm and cklmn. We stress that this conclu-
sion holds due to the specific form (22) of the non-linear
terms, i.e. the conclusion need not hold if new terms
in fitness are introduced for some ad hoc reason. It will
play a role in understanding general implications of these
terms; see section VIII.
IV. FITNESS: TIME-AVERAGE VERSUS
EFFECTIVE
Equation (20) implies that the relative growth of two
morphs is determined by the effective fitness difference:
d
dt
(p¯k/p¯l) = (p¯k/p¯l)(Fk −Fl). (29)
Thus in stable rest points of (20) the (effective) fitness
of surviving morphs are equal to each other, while the
fitness of non-surviving (p¯k → 0) morphs is smaller (Nash
equilibrium) [27, 28].
Another pertinent quantity is the time-averaged fitness
fk[a(t), p(t)]; see (1, 5). Employing (8, 9, 16) we deduce
that this quantity is equal to the effective fitness modulo
small corrections of order of O(ω−2):
Fk = fk(a¯+ a˜, p¯+ ǫ) +O(ω
−2). (30)
The overall fitness of the population is characterized by
the mean effective fitness p¯αFα =
∑n
α=1 p¯αFα, which is
also equal to its time-averaged analogue:
Φ ≡ (p¯α + ǫα)(a¯αβ + a˜αβ)(p¯β + ǫβ) = p¯αFα +O(
1
ω2
),
p¯αFα = a¯αβ p¯αp¯β + bαβγ p¯αp¯β p¯γ . (31)
The contribution cαβγδp¯αp¯β p¯γ p¯δ in p¯αFα nullifies due to
(22) and aˆb˜ = −a˜bˆ.
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FIG. 1: Schematic portrait of (37) for C = 0 [upper diagram]
and for C satisfying conditions (41) [lower diagram]. Stable
[unstable] rest points are denoted by circles [squares]. Arrows
indicate direction of flow in time.
The mean fitness Φ is especially important for genetic
selection, aik(t) = aki(t), since for the constant payoff
situation (aik = aki do not depend on time) in the repli-
cator equation (2), Φ monotonically increases towards
its nearest local maximum over the set of variables p¯k
[9, 10, 27]. This is the fundamental theorem of natural
selection.
It may seem that (31) recovers the known statement
by Levins that the effective overall fitness in a rapidly-
changing (fine-grained) environment is given by the av-
erage fitness [1] 4. The essential point made by Levins
that the average fitness increases in time (for rapidly-
changing environments and symmetric pay-offs). How-
ever, we shall see below that due to non-linear terms
(22) the effective (= averaged) fitness Φ can decrease
in time, specifically when the environment-induced poly-
morphism is essential. Thus, the fundamental theorem
of natural selection can be violated in rapidly-changing
environment, despite of the fact that the effective fitness
is equal to the time-averaged fitness.
V. TWO MORPHS
A. Rest-points
For n = 2, Eq. (2) simplifies to a closed equation for
the frequency p1
p˙1(t) = p1(1− p1)[A(τ) −B(τ)p1], τ = ωt, (32)
where we denoted for periodic functions of time [cf. (3)]:
A(τ) ≡ a12(τ) − a22(τ), (33)
B(τ) ≡ a21(τ) + a12(τ)− a11(τ)− a22(τ). (34)
4 Levins derived this statement from several qualitative assump-
tions. As noted by Strobeck, this statement is basically a pos-
tulate, and need not hold for all reasonable models of rapidly-
changing environments [16].
6We proceed from (32) along the lines of (16, 17). For
the frequency p1 we get
p1 = p¯1 +
1
ω
p¯1(1− p¯1) [ Aˆ(τ) − Bˆ(τ)p¯1 ] +O
(
1
ω2
)
,(35)
where Aˆ(τ) and Bˆ(τ) are defined from A˜(τ) and B˜(τ)
analogously to (4, 5, 6). Now defining
C ≡
1
ω
Aˆ B˜ =
1
ω
(aˆ12 − aˆ22) (a˜21 − a˜11) (36)
for the non-linear factor, we deduce from (16, 17, 32, 7)
˙¯p1(t) = p¯1(1− p¯1)[A¯− B¯p¯1 − Cp¯1(1 − p¯1)]. (37)
The vertices p¯1 = 1 and p¯1 = 0 are always rest points
of (37), while two interior rest points are
π1,2 =
1
2C
[B¯ + C ∓
√
(B¯ + C)2 − 4A¯C ], (38)
If π1 and π2 are in (0, 1), then π1 is stable, while π2 is
unstable. This follows from (38) and also from the fact
that in the vicinity of e.g. the rest-point π1, (37) reads:
d
dt
[p¯1 − π1] = π1(1− π1)(p¯1 − π1)(p¯1 − π2)C. (39)
We also get π1 < π2 for C > 0 and π1 > π2 for C < 0.
The analysis of (37) reduces to the following scenarios.
B. Emergence of polymorphism
Let the time-averages hold
A¯ > 0 and A¯ > B¯. (40)
Now the morph 1 globally dominates for C = 0, i.e.,
for all initial conditions p¯1 goes to 1 for large times; see
Fig. 1. (A¯ > 0 ensures that p = 0 is unstable rest point,
while A¯ > B¯ ensures that p = 1 is a stable rest point.)
The global dominance does not change for C < 0, be-
cause for a negative C (and under conditions (40)), both
new stable point π1 and π2 fall out of the interval [0, 1].
One can call this dominating morph generalist [2], since
it adapts to the time-averaged environment.
Provided that (40) holds, for
C ≥ 2A¯− B¯ + 2
√
A¯ 2 − A¯B¯, (41)
i.e., when C is large enough, both π1 and π2 fall into
the interval [0, 1], see Fig. 1, while if condition (41) does
not hold, both π1 and π2 are not in this interval. When
condition (41) saturates as equality, we get
π1 = π2 =
1
B¯
[
A¯−
√
A¯ 2 − A¯B¯
]
,
which under conditions (40) is always in the interval [0, 1].
Thus, when C increases from a smaller value and then
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FIG. 2:
Oscillating curve: solution of (32) with A(ωt) = 0.1− sin(ωt),
B(ωt) = cos(ωt) with ω = 1 and the initial condition p1(0) =
0.8. With these A(τ ) and B(τ ), the parameter C in (36) is
equal to 0.5.
Smooth curve: solution of the effective equation (37) with
A¯ = 0.1 and B¯ = 0 and C = 0.5, and initial condition p¯1(0) =
0.5528. The difference between the initial conditions p¯1(0)
and p1(0) is calculated according to (25). With time p¯1(t)
converges to the rest point π1 = 0.276393. For the unstable
rest point we have π2 = 0.723607.
Straight line: the long-time average of p1(t) equal to 0.32.
The approximate equality between the long-time average and
π1 improves upon increasing C or decreasing A¯ (and |B¯| if it
is non-zero).
starts to satisfy (41), π1 and π2 move from the complex
plane into the interval [0, 1], i.e., generically [from the
viewpoint of conditions (40)] they do not appear in this
interval via crossing its boundaries. This is natural, be-
cause at the boundaries the term −Cp¯1(1 − p¯1) in (37)
nullifies.
Thus if condition (41) holds [in addition to (40)], a
stable rest point π1 emerges, which attracts all the tra-
jectories that start from p¯1(0) < π2: the polymorphism
is created by the non-linear term ∝ C in (37).
Initial condition larger than the unstable rest point
π2, p¯1(0) > π2, still tend to p¯1 = 1; see Fig. 1. Both sta-
ble rest points π1 and 1 are Evolutionary Stable States
(ESS), meaning that they cannot be invaded by a suffi-
ciently small mutant population [27, 28]. The coexistence
of two ESS one of which is interior (i.e., polymorphic) is
impossible for a two-player replicator equation with con-
stant pay-offs [27, 28], but it is possible for multi-player
replicator equation [38]. We thus saw above an example
of this behavior induced by time-varying environment.
C. Modification of the existing polymorphism
For C = 0 and
B¯ > A¯ > 0 (42)
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FIG. 3: Normal curve: p1(t) as obtained from solving (32)
with A(ωt) = 0.1− sin(ωt), B(ωt) = cos(ωt) with ω = 1, and
initial condition p1(0) = 0.5; cf. Fig. 2.
Dashed curve: p¯1(t)+ǫ1(t), where p¯1(t) is obtained from solv-
ing the effective equation (37), and where ǫ1(t) = ǫ1[p¯1(t), ωt]
is the corresponding oscillating factor found in (16). Accord-
ing to (37), for considered times p¯1 converged to the stable
fixed point π1. For the present case C = 0.5. The time-
average of p(t) does hold (37). Comparing with Fig. 4, where
A¯ is larger, it is seen that the approximate equality between
p1(t) and p¯1(t) + ǫ1(t) is better for the smaller value of A¯.
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FIG. 4: The same as in Fig. 3, but with A(ωt) = 0.121 −
sin(ωt), i.e. with a larger value of A¯. The figure represents a
metastable polymorphism, since p(t) tends to increase slowly,
i.e. it does not hold (37) for long times, and coverges to p1 = 1
for times t > 230.
there is a stable polymorphism at the rest point p¯1 =
A¯/B¯. The presence of C 6= 0 in (37) does not change
this polymorphism qualitatively; only the value of the
rest point shifts to π1, which is now always in the interval
[0, 1]. The shift of the fixed point can be sizable.
Likewise, for
B¯ < A¯ < 0, (43)
and C = 0 there is an unstable polymorphism: all the
initial conditions with p¯1(0) < A¯/B¯ end up at p1 = 0
(morph 2 dominates), while those with p1(0) > A¯/B¯ fin-
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FIG. 5: As compared to Fig. (2) the value of A¯ is decreased
and is now equal to 0.05. This changes the values of the rest
points: π1 = 0.112702 and π2 = 0.887298. p1(t) and p¯1(t)
are still given by, respectively, oscillating curve and smooth
curve. The value of the long-time average of p1(t) is now
0.1261 (straight line), which is rather close to π1 (the long-
time limit of the smooth curve).
ish at p1 = 1 (morph 1 dominates). Now C 6= 0 in (37)
shifts the unstable rest point to π2. Again, the shift can
be significant in some situations.
Conditions (40, 41, 42, 43) gave all possible non-trivial
scenarios for two morphs, because other relations be-
tween A¯ and B¯ amount to interchanging the morphs.
D. Validity of the theory beyond the large-ω
assumption
We now proceed to numerical comparison between the
exact equation (32) and the effective (time-averaged)
equation (37). Our aim is to show that the approximate
validity of (37) extends beyond the large-ω limit.
Figs. 2, 3 and 4 compare the solution p1(t) of (32) with
the corresponding solution p¯1(t) of (37). Here we took
ω = 1 to make clear that the frequency is not very large,
and hence we are looking beyond the applicability of the
above theory. The initial conditions p1(0) and p¯1(0) were
adjusted acording to (25). It is seen that though the qual-
itative agreement is good—in particular, p1(t) does con-
verge with time to a polymorphic state, where its time-
average is constant— there is a visible quantitative dif-
ference between the long-time averages calculated from
the solution (32) and the rest point π1 predicted from
(37). The quantitative agreement is improved either by
increasing ω (i.e., making the environmental oscillations
faster) or by decreasing A¯ and B¯ (i.e., by slowing down
the change of p1(t)). This is demonstrated in Fig. 5.
As discussed in section III B, the same initial condi-
tions p1(0) can lead to a different attractor depending
on the initial phase of the oscillating functions A(τ) and
B(τ). This phenomenon is clearly seen on Fig. 6. We
stress that this dependence is not a special feature of
8the considered stable polymorphic state. It will appear
whenever there is a fast environment and the space of
p1 posseses several attractors, e.g., for the unstable poly-
morphic case studied in section VC; see (43).
Fig. 7 shows that polymorphism survivies for a smaller
frequency ω.
Fig. 4 demonstrates an interesting phenomenon of
metastable polymorphism: the correspondence between
(32) and (37)— i.e. between p1(t) and p¯1 + ǫ1— is rea-
sonable for times up t ≃ 200 (this characteristic time
depends on initial conditions, the estimate seen in Fig. 4
was got with initial conditions p1(0) = 0.5). For larger
times, the real solution converges to p1 = 1. Thus p¯1+ ǫ1
is capable of describing the metastable polymorphism
within its life-time that is much longer than the char-
acteristic time 1/ω of environmental oscillations.
E. Two morphs within mathematical genetics
1. Interpretations in terms of genetics
Eq. (32) under additional condition
a12(τ) = a21(τ). (44)
is a well-known Fisher equation from population genet-
ics that describes the selection for a two-alelle gene (with
frequencies p1 and p2, respectively) in one locus [9, 10].
Then akl are the Malthusian fitnesses for the zygote
formed by the alleles k and l. In particular, a11 and a22
refer to two homozygotes, while a12 = a21 refers to the
heterozygote. (A short and accessible review on genetic
notions is given in Ref. [9].)
Let us now briefly comment on some of above results
in the light of mathematical genetics, i.e. assuming (44).
(1) Conditions (42) for a stable polymorphism translate
to a¯12 > a¯11, a¯22, and refer to the heterozygote advan-
tage [9].
(2) Note that C in (36, 37) vanishes whenever the ho-
mozygotes are symmetric for all times a11(τ) = a22(τ), or
whenever one allele (say allele 2) is recessive for all times
a11(τ) = a12(τ). Both cases are easily solvable from (32)
showing that the long-time behavior of p1 is indeed gov-
erned by A¯; so there is no room for the non-linear terms.
(3) The simplest case for non-zero C is perhaps when
the heterozygote fitness a12 is constant in time, but the
homozygote fitnesses a11(t) and a22(t) oscillate in time
with different phases, e.g., when a11(t) is maximal a22(t)
is minimal and vice versa.
(4) In section VC, after (42) we stressed that the en-
vironmental influence, i.e. C 6= 0, can sizably shift the
stable rest-point thereby facilitating polymorphism. An
important example of this type is given by the following
mechanism of the recessive allele survival. For
B¯ = A¯ > 0 or a¯12 = a¯11 > a¯22, (45)
the time-averaged fitnesses predict that the allele 2 is re-
cessive, i.e., its presence does not influence on the fitness
of the heterozygote, while the fitness of the corresponding
homozygote 22 is smaller.
For C < A¯ (in particular for C = 0) the only stable rest
point is p1 = 1, which means that the allele is absent from
the population. However, for C > A¯ the poymorphism is
recovered, since now [see (38)]
π1 = A¯/C. (46)
Thus the rapidly-changing environment can lead to a sig-
nificant expression of the allele which is recessive in av-
erage.
2. Previous literature
Periodic time-dependencies in A(t) and B(t) [cf. (32)]
were studied by Kimura [12], Nagylaki [11], and Li [13]
in modelling environmental influences on genetic selec-
tion. These authors concentrate on cases (e.g. A(t) = 0
or B(t) = 0), where non-trivial mechanisms of polymor-
phism are absent. Below we shall focus on those situa-
tions, where Eq. (32) with time-independent A and B is
not solvable exactly, but instead we obtain a non-trivial
scenario of polymorphism.
Within the continuous-time consideration, Nagylaki
[11] focussed on the case [cf. (23)]
A(τ) = a h(τ), B(τ) = b h(τ), τ = ωt (47)
where h(τ) is a periodic function with h(t) = 0, and
where a and b are constants. Note that A¯ = B¯ = 0
according to (47). Now (32) can be solved exactly (i.e.
independently from the magnitude of ω), leading one to
conclude that (32) cannot have stable rest-points, i.e. the
convergence in time p1(t) → prp is excluded for prp ∈
[0, 1]. We are however interested in stable rest-points for
the time-average p¯, hence we turn to analyzing (37) under
(47) and a sufficiently large ω.
For this case we obtain from (37): ˙¯p1 = 0, a conclusion
that is very well confirmed numerically and extends to
higher orders in the 1ω expansion; see Appendix A and
(A15) there. Hence Nagylaki did not find polymorphism
scenarios under conditions (47).
F. Average fitness and Lyapunov function
Eqs. (31) for the mean, time-averaged fitness Φ read
after using (33, 34)
Φ = 2A¯p¯1 − B¯p¯
2
1. (48)
For A¯ > 0 and A¯ > B¯ (where the first morph domi-
nates according to the average fitness), we get ∂Φ/∂p¯1 >
0. Hence Φ maximizes at p¯1 = 1, and this maximum is
the only stable rest point of the replicator dynamics (37)
with C = 0. If however C satisfies conditions (41), in the
stable rest point p¯1 = π1 the mean fitness Φ is smaller
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FIG. 6: This figure illustrates how the basins of attraction
for two stable rest points π1 and 1 change depending on the
phase of oscillating functions A(τ ) [τ = ωt] and B(τ ) at the
initial time t = 0.
Normal curve: solution of (32) with A(τ ) = 0.1 − sin(ωt),
B(τ ) = cos(ωt) with ω = 1 and the initial condition p1(0) =
0.8.
Dashed curve: solution of (32) with A(τ ) = 0.1 + sin(ωt),
B(τ ) = − cos(ωt) with ω = 1 and the same initial condition
p1(0) = 0.8.
It is seen that for one phase p1(t) converges in averages to π1,
while for another phase it goes to 1.
than at the stable point p¯1 = 1. Moreover, for the initial
conditions π1 < p¯1(0) < π2, the mean fitness Φ decreases
in the course of the relaxation to π1. We confirmed this
statement directly from equations of motion; see Table I.
Hence, the existence of a polymorphism does not have
an adaptive value for the overall population, because the
overall fitness decreases. We saw in section VC that
the polymorphism which already exist on the level of the
average environment appears to be robust with respect to
environmental variations. So the value of polymorphism
might be connected with this robustness.
Eq. (37) can be written as
˙¯p1 = p¯(1 − p¯)
∂Ψ
∂p¯
, (49)
Ψ = 2A¯p¯1 − B¯p¯
2
1 − Cp¯
2
1(1−
2p¯1
3
)
= Φ− Cp¯21(1 −
2p¯1
3
). (50)
Hence Ψ is increased by dynamics (37): Ψ˙ ≥ 0. The
difference between the mean fitness Φ and the Lyapunov
function Ψ is yet another indication that Φ does not need
to increase in the slow time. Let us emphasize that there
is no relation between the sign of Ψ−Φ and the existence
of the environment-induced polymorphism.
TABLE I: The solution of (32) was obtained under the same
parameters as for Fig. 2. Then the time-dependence overall
fitness Φ(t) was calculated accroding to Φ(t) = 2A(τ )p(t)−
B(τ )p2(t); see (31, 33, 34) and note an irrelevant factor a22(t)
in Φ(t) was neglected. After that we time-averaged this fit-
ness around the points t0 with the same time-window tw = 25:
Φ¯(t0) =
1
2tw
∫ t0+tw
t0−tw
dsΦ(s). The results for Φ¯(t0) are dis-
played below and show that the time-averaged fitness de-
creases with increasing t0.
t0 = 25 0.09627
t0 = 75 0.07192
t0 = 125 0.06467
t0 = 175 0.06244
t0 = 225 0.06167
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FIG. 7: The purpose of this figure is to illustrate that the
qualitative picture of polymorphism survives for smaller val-
ues of ω, i.e., it survives for slower environment.
The same parameters as in Fig. 2, besides ω = 0.25.
Normal curve: solution of (32) with initial condition p1(0) =
0.999.
Dashed curve: solution of (32) with initial condition p1(0) =
0.9999.
It is seen that the stability domain of the rest point p1 = 1 is
heavily reduced.
VI. THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA
As another pertinent illustration we consider the pris-
oner’s game [39]. There are two players I and II. Each
one has two strategies: d (defect) and c (cooperate). Pay-
offs are determined by the following matrix
I/II d c
d P, P T, S
c S, T R, R
=
I/II 1 2
1 a11, a11 a12, a21
2 a21, a12 a22, a22
, (51)
where e.g. the actions d and c by respectively I and II
result to pay-offs T and S, and where the second matrix
in (51) relates to (1, 2). Eq. (51) becomes a dilemma
after imposing:
T > R > P > S. (52)
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For both players defecting (d) is a dominant strategy, i.e.
for both I and II acting d yields a higher payoff than
c (cooperating), no matter what the opponent does; see
(51, 52) and note that (d, d) is the only Nash equilibrium
of game (51). Both players can get R > P , if they both
act c. But acting c is vulnerable, since the opponent can
change to d, gain out of this, and leave the cooperator
with the minimal pay-off S. This makes the dilemma,
which raised deep questions about rationality and coop-
eration [27, 39, 40] and produced a vast literature [41–45].
We focus on the case when pay-offs in (51) are time-
periodic functions. Starting from (1, 2, 3), the time-
dependent replicator equation reduces to (32), where
A(τ) = T (τ)−R(τ), τ = ωt, (53)
B(t) = T (τ)−R(τ) + S(τ) − P (τ). (54)
If (52) is imposed on pay-offs at all times, then A(τ) > 0
and A(τ) > B(τ). Then the always defection strategy
p1 = 1 is the only rest-point of the time-dependent (32),
i.e. we are back to the prisoner’s dilemma.
A reasonable way to study the prisoner’s game for a
rapidly changing environment is to impose condition (52)
only on average
T¯ > R¯ > P¯ > S¯. (55)
Now (53–55) show that we are in the situation dis-
cussed in section VB: there is no polymorphism on
the level of the average fitness. But if condition (41)
holds, the polymorphism does emerge. The positivity of
C = 1ω (Tˆ − Rˆ)(S˜ − P˜ ) means here that the changes of
T˜ (τ) − R˜(τ) and of S˜(τ) − P˜ (τ) are correlated.
Hence a time-dependent environment can resolve the
prisoner’s dilemma that exists on the level of the aver-
age fitness. Other scenarios of resolving the dilemma are
reviewed in [46–48].
VII. THREE MORPHS
A. Rock-scissors-paper game
Besides mathematical genetics [9, 10], the replica-
tor dynamics is also applied for modeling biodiversity
[27, 28]. For concretness we shall focus on the situation
with cyclic dominance, which exists for at least three
morphs and requires asymmetric pay-offs. Cyclic domi-
nance means that morphs 1, 2 and 3 win over each other;
e.g. 1 beats 2, 2 beats 3, and 3 beats 1 (rock-scissors-
paper game) [49]. The simplest and perhaps most pop-
ular example of cyclic dominance is realized under the
zero-sum condition in (2) [see (66) for an example]:
akl(τ) = −alk(τ), τ = ωt. (56)
Eq. (56) means that the loss of the strategy l is equal to
the gain of k. Here is an incomplete list of realistic exam-
ples that contain cyclic dominance: i) mating strategies
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FIG. 8: The portrait of (57) for a¯12 = 0.1, a¯13 = 0.1, a¯23 =
−0.1, κ1 = −0.65 and κ2 = 0.65; p¯1 and p¯2 are restricted
by 0 ≤ p¯1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ p¯2 ≤ 1, p¯1 + p¯2 ≤ 1. Two rest points
are denoted by square (saddle) and cycle (center). The closed
orbits contain the center in their interior; orbits from the
second class converge to p¯1 = 1. These two classes of orbits
are separated by a dashed curve (separatrix), which is made
by joining together two directions (stable and unstable) of the
saddle. Arrows indicate direction of flow.
of side-blotched lizards [50]; ii) overgrowths by marine
sessile organisms [51]; iii) competition between bacterial
populations [52].
Though the zero-sum condition frequently does not
produce structurally stable results 5, it is still very useful,
since one can give a general description of the constant-
payoff, akl(τ) = a¯kl, zero-sum situation [54]: starting
from the interior of the simplex—that is starting from
a point, where all the fractions are strictly positive:
pk > 0—any trajectory either remains in the interior per-
forming there a Hamiltonian motion 6, or it converges
to the boundary, where some fractions pk are equal to
zero. Once restricted to the boundary, the situation re-
duces to a zero-sum game with a smaller number of vari-
ables and the above reasoning can be applied again [54].
Which scenario is realized depends on the concrete form
of akl(τ) = a¯kl; see below.
We stress that we also studied the three-morph case
for the symmetric pay-off situation akl(τ) = alk(τ), but
the qualitative results on the environment-induced poly-
morphism were similar to the zero-sum case [see in this
context section VIII below], so we choose to concentrate
on the latter, because its presentation is simpler.
Under condition (56) the effective replicator equation
(20, 21) reduces to
˙¯pi =
∑3
α=1
p¯ia¯iαp¯α + κip¯1p¯2p¯3, i = 1, 2, 3, (57)
5 A structurally stable model for the oscillating regime of the rock-
paper-scissors game has been recently proposed in [53].
6 A Hamiltonian motion means that there is one globally conserved
function of the fractions pk(t), and that the suitably defined
phase-space volume is conserved; see [54] for details.
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FIG. 9: Parametric plot of solutions p1 and p2 of the replica-
tor equation (1, 2) for n = 3 (three morphs), t ∈ [0, 600]
and a12(ωt) = −a21(ωt) = 0.1, a13(ωt) = −a31(ωt) =
0.1+
√
2ω a sin(ωt), a23(ωt) = −a32(ωt) = 0.1+
√
2ω a cos(ωt),
a =
√
0.65, ω = 2. The initial conditions are p1(0) = p2(0) =
0.25.
Then the effective motion for p¯1 and p¯2 holds parameters
shown on Fig. 8 independently on the value of ω.
where
κ1 = b123 + b132 =
1
ω
(−a˜13 aˆ23 + a˜12 aˆ23), (58)
κ2 = b213 + b231 = −
1
ω
(a˜23 aˆ13 + a˜12 aˆ13), (59)
with
κ1 + κ2 + κ3 = 0, (60)
as needed for the conservation of normalization. It is
seen that for the zero-sum situation the four-party terms
cklmn disappear, since the payoffs are anti-symmetric.
Recall the interpretation of (57) with i = 1: besides
the payoffs a12 and a13 got by the strategy 1 when con-
fronting with 2 and 3, respectively, there is a payment κ1
which is received by the strategy 1 when it is confronted
with the strategies 2 and 3 together. Eqs. (57) i = 2, 3
are interpreted in a similar way.
The phase structure of (57) will be constructed in
terms of independent variables p¯1 and p¯2 with 0 ≤
p¯1 + p¯2 ≤ 1. For the internal rest points we have:
a¯12p¯2 + a¯13(1 − p¯1 − p¯2) + κ1p¯2(1− p¯1 − p¯2) = 0,
−a¯12p¯1 + a¯23(1 − p¯1 − p¯2) + κ2p¯1(1− p¯1 − p¯2) = 0.
(61)
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FIG. 10: The first morph population p1 versus time for the
same parameters as in Fig. 9.
Black curve: ω = 1.85. Blue curve: ω = 2. Red curve: no
environmental changes: ω = 0.
It is seen that p1(t) performs fast oscillations, and then slower
motion that is oscillatory for the blue curve and increasing for
the black curve.
The Jacobian at these rest points is
−

 p¯1(a¯13 + κ1p¯2)
p¯1
p¯2
(a¯13(1− p1) + κ1p¯
2
2)
p¯2
p¯1
(a¯23(1− p¯2) + κ2p¯
2
1) −p¯1(a¯13 + κ1p¯2)

 ,
while the eigenvalues of the Jacobian reads:
±
[
p¯21(a¯13 + κ1p¯2)
2
+(a¯13(1− p¯1) + κ1p¯
2
2)(a¯23(1− p¯2) + κ2p¯
2
1)
]1/2
. (62)
Thus any interior rest point can be either saddle (two real
eigenvalues of different sign) or center (two imaginary,
complex conjugate eigenvalues).
We study in separate two different cases.
B. Emergent polymorphism
One morph (say 1) dominates at the level of average
pay-offs:
a¯12 > 0, a¯13 > 0. (63)
Eq. (57) with i = 1 shows that the dominance is kept
for κ1 > 0. Hence for the existence of a polymorphism
(due to κi terms) it is necessary that 2 and 3 together
win over 1 (κ1 < 0), although in separate they loose to 1
according to (63).
There are two further necessary conditions for poly-
morphism that are deduced from the requirement that
terms κip¯1p¯2p¯3 do not turn to zero due to p2 → 0 and/or
p3 → 0. Hence, as (57) shows, we should exclude the
following two conditions:
a¯23 < 0 and κ2 < 0, (64)
a¯23 > 0 and κ3 = −κ1 − κ2 < 0. (65)
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Then it is possible that the (non-linear) terms ∝ κ1, ∝ κ2
and ∝ κ3 in (57) change the phase-space portrait. Due
to the non-linear terms two interior rest points appear in
the triangle 0 ≤ p¯1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ p¯2 ≤ 1, p¯1 + p¯2 ≤ 1; see
Fig. 8. The rest point with a smaller p¯1 is center, while
the rest point with a larger p¯1 is a saddle.
The phase-space is thus divided into two domains: the
first domains contains closed orbits around the center; see
Fig. 8. These orbits correspond to the polymorphism: all
the fractions p¯1, p¯2 and p¯3 stay non-zero for all times.
The second domain contains trajectories that converge
to p¯1 = 1 for large times; see Fig. 8. The two domains
are divided by the separatrix, a closed orbit that passes
through the saddle; see Fig. 8. This scenario of polymor-
phism is similar to the one for the two-morph situation;
see around (41).
Figs. 9 and 10 show the behaviour of the original repli-
cator equation (1, 2) with asymmetric pay-offs [cf. (56)],
whose time-averages relate to (effective) parameters of
Fig. 8. Now Fig. 9 shows that a single trajectory fills
a sizable part of the phase-space available for the poly-
morphism. Fig. 10 contrasts the behavior of p1(t) in the
polymorphic regime—which consists of fast and slow os-
cillations—with what we called a metastable polymor-
phism in Fig. 4; see the black curve in Fig. 10. Now the
metastable polymorphism is realized when the frequency
of environmental oscillations is not sufficiently large, i.e.
ω = 1.85 versus ω = 2 for parameters of Figs. 9 and 10.
It amounts to fast oscillations of p1(t) around a value
sizably smaller than 1, which then squeeze (for t > 100),
and then p1(t) goes to 1, i.e. the polymorphism is de-
stroyed, since the morph 1 eventually wins over 2 and 3;
see the black curve on Fig. 10. Note that the life-time,
t ≃ 100, of this metastable polymorphism is much larger
than the period of environmental oscillations, as well as
the relaxation time (to p1 = 1) for the time-independent
environment; see Fig. 10 and cf. Fig. 4.
C. Existing polymorphism
Now let us assume that there is polymorphism already
at the average level:
a¯12 > 0, a¯13 < 0, a¯23 > 0, (66)
which means a cyclic competition: the strategy 1 wins
over 2, but looses to 3, while 2 wins over 3. This is the
zero-sum version of the rock-scissors-paper game [27, 28].
Thus for κ1 = κ2 = κ3 = 0 in (57) there is already one
rest interior point, and the trajectories of the system are
closed orbits around this rest point. It appears that after
including the three-party (∝ κi) terms in (57) this rest
point is simply shifted, and no new rest points appear
for any size or magnitude of κi. We get the same conclu-
sion as for the n = 2 case: the non-linear (multi-party)
terms do not spoil the polymorphism that already exists
without them; see section VC.
VIII. FEATURES OF POLYMORPHISM
RELATED TO POINCARE´ INDICES
In sections V and VII we noted that the non-linear
terms (22) in the effective replicator equation produce
either two new rest points (one stable and another un-
stable), or do not produce new rest points at all, although
they can sizably shift the existing interior rest points (in-
terior means that all components of the rest point are
positive). Moreover, generically the new fixed points are
produced directly in the interior, i.e., they do not have
to appear via crossing of the boundaries for the simplex
region {0 ≤ p¯k ≤ 1}
n
k=1,
∑n
k=1 p¯k = 1.
These effects suggest a common mechanism, which will
be discussed below in terms of Poincare´ indices. Recall
that rest-points of the (non-linear) replicator dynamics
(20, 21) are defined via Γk[π] = 0. At regular rest points
the Jacobian has non-zero determinant. We do not con-
sider non-regular rest points, because they turn to be reg-
ular under small perturbation. Each regular rest point π
can be associated with its Poincare´ index:
Ind[π] = sign det
(
∂Γi[p¯]
∂p¯k
)∣∣∣∣
p¯=pi
, i, k = 1, . . . , n− 1,
where ∂Γi[p¯]∂p¯k is the Jacobian matrix, and where we as-
sume that in defining the Jacobian an independent set of
coordinates was selected (since
∑n
k=1 p¯k = 1, only n− 1
probabilities p¯k are independent). For instance in the
two-dimensional situation (i.e., for two independent co-
ordinates p¯1 and p¯2) the Poincare´ of a saddle is −1 (be-
cause the Jacobian has two eigenvalues of different sign),
while the Poincare´ index of center is +1 (the Jacobian
has two imaginary, complex conjugate eigenvalues). For
a stable (unstable) rest-point in p-dimensional space the
Poincare´ index is equal to (−1)p (1).
Recall the content of the Poincare´-Hopf theorem as
applied to the replicator equation [27]: for regular rest
points π of replicator dynamics (20, 21) one has
∑′
pi
Ind[π] = (−1)n−1, (67)
where the sum
∑′
pi is taken over those rest points π of
(20) which either have all their components strictly pos-
itive πk > 0, or if some of those components are zero, we
have for each zero component πi = 0:[
Fi(p¯)−
∑n
α=1
p¯αFα(p¯) ]
∣∣∣
p¯=pi
< 0. (68)
Condition (68) can be rephrased by saying that if a
morph i is missing within the rest-point (i.e. πi = 0),
then its fitness is smaller than the mean fitness.
In addition to (67) we recall that the non-linear term
bklm and cklmn in the effective replicator equation (20,
21) do not influence on the stability of the vertex rest
points, where all p¯k’s besides one nullify; see our discus-
sion in section III C.
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Eq. (67) shows that the conclusion of section V on
the simultaneous emergence of two new rest-points (one
stable and another unstable) is a general feature of (20,
21). Indeed, for even values of n, stable rest-points have
Ind = −1 (since the number of independent variables
is odd, and each one brings factor −1 into the index).
Hence according to (67), such a stable rest-point has to
emerge simultaneously with another rest-point that has
at least one unstable direction. Likewise, for odd values
of n, where stable rest-points have Ind = 1.
Consider the three-morph situation with independent
probabilities p¯1 and p¯2. If the non-linear terms (22) cre-
ate a stable rest point in the interior (polymorphism),
then the sum of Poincare´ indices increases by 1. So for
(67) to hold, a saddle (with Poincare´ index −1) rest-point
has to be created as well. Taken together with the fact
that the stability of the vertices is not altered, this then
implies that two directions of the saddle has to joint to-
gether and form a closed curve that would separate the
attraction basin of the newly created stable rest point.
This was the scenario we saw in section VII 7.
Can the non-linear terms bklm and cklmn turn the sta-
ble polymorphic stable rest point—which exists already
without them—into an unstable rest-point? This is not
excluded by (67), because both rest-points have Ind = 1,
but it is incompatible with the fact that the stability of
the vertices is not altered by the non-linear terms. It is
though not excluded that the non-linear terms would lead
to changing of the old stable node into a unstable node
surrounded by a stable limit cycle. Although we did not
find such scenarios of the polymorphism emergence, from
the conceptual viewpoint such a scenario will not change
our basic qualitative conclusion that the poymorphism
which exists without non-linear terms is (generically) not
eliminated by them. The same argument shows that an
unstable rest point cannot turn into a stable one without
generating new rest points.
IX. SUMMARY AND OPEN PROBLEMS
We discussed a mechanism of polymorphism that ex-
ists within continuous-time population dynamics due to
a rapidly-changing (fine-grained) time-periodic environ-
ment. The characteristic time of environmental oscilla-
tions is larger than the the time over which the frac-
tions of the sub-populations (morphs) change system-
atically (i.e. in average) [1, 15]. Various mechanisms
of polymorpshim were at the focus of population biol-
ogy for decades [1–10]. Such polymorphism scenarios as
7 Due to the zero-sum feature (56) of the example considered in
section VII, the stable rest point was only neutrally stable. How-
ever, if condition (56) is (slightly) relaxed one can obtain also
asymptotic stability of the polymorphic rest-point created by
non-linear terms bklm and cklmn.
frequency-dependent selection and heterozygote advan-
tage are at the basis of the current population thinking.
Polymorphism induced by inhomogeneous environment
also attracted muchattention[1–10]. So far this attention
focussed on the slow (coarse-grained) environment, be-
cause early arguments implied that non-trivial polymor-
phism scenarios are absent for a rapidly-changing envi-
ronment [1, 15, 16]. Also the earlier studies of replicator
dynamics in a time-dependent environment concentrated
on those particular cases, where non-trivial scenarios of
polymorphism are indeed absent [11–13].
Starting from the replicator equation in a fast time-
periodic environment we got an effective replicator equa-
tion for the time-averaged fractions of morphs. The
main difference with the ordinary replicator equation in
the time-independent environment—which for symmetric
pay-offs reduces to the Fisher equations of mathematical
genetics [9, 10]—is that the fitness contains additional
non-linear terms that appear due to the morphs tracking
the environmental changes (the linear terms in the fitness
correspond to the time-averaged environment). The pres-
ence of such tracking in a rapidly-changing (fine-grained)
environment is established observationally [25]. The form
of non-linear terms allows to draw general conclusions on
the stability and the effective fitness.
The non-linear terms can create a stable polymorphic
state. But they generically do not destroy polymor-
phism that exists without the presence of these terms
(i.e., for the averaged environment). Our results are
worked out for three pertinent cases: genetic selection
between two morphs (alleles), prisoner’s dilemma game
(where polymorphism implies a resolution of the pris-
oner’s dilemma due to a time-varying environment), and
the rock-paper-scissors game between three cyclically
dominating morphs.
For the symmetric-pay-off situation [genetic selection]
the fitness of the overall population can decrease due
to the polymorphism. Once the existing polymorphism
is generically not modified by the environment-induced
terms, the adaptive value of the polymorphism is in in-
creasing the structural stability of the population under
influence of a time-dependent environment.
Several open problems are suggested by this research.
– One should clarify to which extent the uncovered
mechanism of polymorphism is relevant for the phe-
nomenon of sympatric speciation, where by contrast to
the allopatric scenario the speciation is induced inside
a single population [55]. (Within the allopatric scenario
sub-populations are first isolated geographically and only
then speciate). Interestingly, the decrease of the mean
fitness was argued to be a prerequisite for the sympatric
speciation [55]. Thus, our results hint at a sympatric spe-
ciation scenario due to a rapidly-changing, time-periodic
environment.
– How to extend the present approach to multi-locus
genetic selection, where polymorpshim related to a slow
environment was studied recently in [56]?
– It will be interesting to develop the present approach
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for Eigen-Schuster model and its ramifications living on
dynamic landscapes; see [6] for a review.
– The basic Lotka-Volterra equations of ecological dy-
namics can be recast in the form (2) and studied as repli-
cators [27]. Note however that despite of this mathemat-
ical equivalence the ecological (and biological) content
of Lotka-Volterra equations differs from that of replica-
tors. This especially concerns the time-scale separation
issues (i.e. the division between slow and fast), because
Lotka-Volterra equations have additional time-scales [57].
Though the theory developed above does not apply di-
rectly to Lotka-Volterra equations, developing such ap-
plications is a pertinent avenue of future research.
– The present approach was developed assuming that
all time-dependent selection coefficients have the same,
well-defined period. This is restrictive an assumption,
and we expect a richer dynamics upon relaxing it.
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Appendix A: Replicator equation under condition
(23) with second-order terms
The purpose of this Appendix is to extend the asymp-
totic method of section IIIA to the order O(ω−2), and
thereby to understand implications of condition (23). Re-
call that under (23), the non-linear terms (22) in the fit-
ness are absent. For simplicity we shall work with n = 2
(two morphs).
Our first conclusion is that under condition (23) the
terms O(ω−2) that modify the replicator equation are
perturbative—i.e. they have to be smaller than the terms
given by the time-averages of pay-offs (selection coeffi-
cients). Our second conclusion (closely related to the
first one) is that these terms are not useful for polymor-
phism.
Consider
p˙ = p(1− p)[A(τ) −B(τ)p], τ = ωt, 0 ≤ p(t) ≤ 1,(A1)
where A(τ) and B(τ) are rapidly-changing functions of
time due to a large ω. The time-averages, as well as the
constant and oscillating parts of A and B are defined
according to (3–7).
Following the method of section III, we look for the
solution p(t) of (A1) as [cf. (8)]
p(t) = p¯(t) +
ǫ1[p¯(t), τ ]
ω
+
ǫ2[p¯(t), ˙¯p(t), τ ]
ω2
+O(
1
ω3
),
(A2)
where the time-averages hold [cf. (9)]
ǫ¯1 = ǫ¯2 = 0. (A3)
Putting (A2) into (A1) we get
˙¯p(t) +
˙¯p(t)ǫ′1
ω
+
˙¯p(t)ǫ′2
ω2
+ ∂τ ǫ1 +
1
ω
∂τ ǫ2 (A4)
= f [p¯, A(τ), B(τ)] +
ǫ1
ω
f ′[p¯, A(τ), B(τ)] (A5)
+
ǫ2
ω2
f ′[p¯, A(τ), B(τ)] +
ǫ21
2ω2
f ′′[p¯, A(τ), B(τ)],(A6)
where we denoted
f(p,A,B) ≡ p(1− p)[A−Bp], (A7)
and ǫ′ and f ′ (resp. ǫ′′ and f ′′) means the first (resp.
second) derivative over the first argument.
On the fast times we collect from (A4) the orders of
O(1) and O(1/ω) respectively [cf. (15, 16)]:
∂τ ǫ1 = f [p¯, A˜, B˜], (A8)
∂τ ǫ2 = − ˙¯pǫ
′
1 + ǫ1f [p¯, A˜, B˜]. (A9)
Before solving (A8, A9), let us assume [cf. (23)]:
A(τ) = A¯+ ah(τ), A(τ) = B¯ + bh(τ), (A10)
where h(τ) = h(τ + 2π) is a periodic function of τ , and
where A¯, B¯, a and b are constants.
Then (A8, A9) are solved as
ǫ1 = f(p¯, a, b)hˆ(τ), (A11)
ǫ2 = [ f(p¯, a, b)f
′(p¯, A¯, B¯)− ˙¯pf ′(p¯, a, b) ]
ˆˆ
h(τ)
+
1
2
f(p¯, a, b)f ′(p¯, a, b)
(
hˆ2(τ) − hˆ2
)
, (A12)
where hˆ(τ) and
ˆˆ
h(τ) are the first and second primitive of
h(t). Both hold the zero average condition hˆ =
ˆˆ
h = 0.
Putting (A11) and (A12) into (A5, A6) and taking the
time-average, we get(
1− χ [f ′(p¯, a, b) ]2
)
˙¯p = f(p¯, A¯, B¯) + χf(p¯, a, b)×[
1
2
f ′′(p¯, A¯, B¯)f(p¯, a, b)− f ′(p¯, A¯, B¯)f ′(p¯, a, b)
]
, (A13)
χ ≡ hˆ hˆ /ω2. (A14)
In contrast to (20), where non-linear fitness terms need
not be small, Eq. (A13) shows that the non-linear fit-
ness terms—those proportional to χ—are smaller than
the average fitness term f(p¯, A¯, B¯). This is seen most
clearly, when we put A¯ = B¯ = 0 and notice that the
right-hand-side of (A14) disappears:(
1− χ [f ′(p¯, a, b) ]2
)
˙¯p = ˙¯p = 0. (A15)
One can still ask whether the terms ∝ χ can lead to
polymorphism in the boundary situation, e.g. given A¯ a
positive but small (i.e. when p¯ = 0 is marginally stable),
can those terms change the stability of these boundary
rest-point. The answer is negative.
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